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We characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-e¢ cient and incentive com-
patible) with the two fundamental axioms of fairness: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. We
consider cases where agents have equal rights over external world resources but are individually
responsible for their preferences/costs. Our characterization answers the political philosophy ques-
tion of what kind of welfare di⁄erentials allowed if we respect private ownership rights over self
and public ownership over external world. We also relate no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence to
"equality of what" debate and build a link between resource and opportunity egalitarianism, and
welfare-egalitarianism.
JEL Classi￿cations: C79, D61, D63.
Key words: egalitarianism, egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy, distributive justice, equality of op-
portunity, resource egalitarianism, private ownership of the self and public ownership of external
world, NIMBY problems, allocation of indivisible goods and money, discrete public goods, strategy-
proofness.
1 Introduction
In this note, we investigate how much inequality in ￿nal outcomes (welfares) is allowed if the public-
ownership of the external world (common resources, conditions of the economy etc.) and private-
ownership of the self (preferences, skills, costs, etc.) is respected. This political philosophy theory is
￿rst introduced by Cohen (1986) and an axiomatic investigation of its implications was carried out
by Moulin and Roemer (1989) in a model with publicly owned production technology and privately
owned skills. They formulate axioms to re￿ ect these property rights, for instance, since technology is
owned collectively, a change in technology should e⁄ect the welfares of agents in the same direction
(technology monotonicity). They arrived at a surprising result: even if one takes the intermediate
political position by respecting private ownership rights over self while still assuming society has
collective rights over the external world, one arrives at the radical egalitarian result of equalizing
welfares, overwriting the e⁄ects of self ownership rights.
We obtain a parallel result in a di⁄erent model and characterize the welfare-egalitarian allocation
mechanisms. There is an extensive literature studying egalitarian solutions (see GinØs and Marhuenda,
2000, and references therein). Unlike the previous literature, the main axioms on which we focus are
￿I thank Prof. John Roemer and other participants at APET 2010 for the discussion on the topic. I am also grateful
to Prof. William Thomson for his guidance and advice.
yThis note is the ￿rst part of a previous unpublished working paper (http://ideas.repec.org/p/adl/wpaper/2010-
01.html) that has been divided into two papers for the clarity of exposition and coherence of content.
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1not solidarity axioms, but the two most fundamental equity concepts in the fair division literature:
no-envy (Foley, 1967: no agent prefers another agent￿ s bundle to her own) and egalitarian-equivalence
(Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978: each agent should be indi⁄erent between her bundle and a common
￿ reference￿bundle). Our contribution is threefold: to provide an alternative foundation for welfare-
egalitarianism based on no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence, to show the compatibility of these two
central fairness notions in a model where their joint implication has not been investigated, and to relate
these axioms to political philosophy on distributive justice, property rights, and "equality of what"
debate. Hence, we follow an axiomatic method to answer the essential questions posed in political
philosophy.
The model we consider di⁄ers from Moulin and Roemer (1989): there is no production, instead, a
set of collectively owned heterogenous discrete resources and monetary transfers are to be distributed
among a ￿nite set of agents who has quasilinear preferences. Another di⁄erence is the assumption
of private information on preferences. Such an assumption seems suitable if preferences are taken as
private property of self as also argued by Moulin and Roemer (1989) in footnote 2. We take strategy-
proofness (reporting the true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents) as our incentive
compatibility constraint. We also require that the discrete resources be allocated e¢ ciently.
As Roemer (1986) states, even if di⁄erent economic environments may give rise to the same utility
possibility set and threat point, these environments would contain di⁄erent economic information
and insights. Similar notions applied in di⁄erent settings, may not characterize the same solutions.
Hence, it is interesting to arrive at a similar conclusion on the political philosophy question examined
by Moulin and Roemer (1989) in an entirely di⁄erent economic environment. However, to obtain
this parallel result, the axioms we considered to re￿ ect the private and public ownership rights are
completely di⁄erent than theirs. As also stated by Roemer (1986), to analyze the same solution,
di⁄erent economic settings may require di⁄erent axioms to re￿ ect the model-speci￿c information. For
instance, the model considered by Moulin and Roemer (1989) included a jointly owned technology,
hence, the appropriate axiom to re￿ ect public ownership of the external world was a solidarity axiom:
technology monotonicity. However, our model is on the distribution of a given set of collectively owned
discrete resources and money over which individuals have equal rights and responsibilities; hence, our
axioms need to re￿ ect the ownership rights over these resources. Existence of various real life examples
makes our model interesting. Examples include auctions held to allocate water entitlements to farmers;
the allocations of ￿shing or pollution permits, allocation of community housing or charitable goods
and money among the needy, managing the use of commonly owned indivisible goods in cooperative
enterprises such as cooperative supported agriculture, allocation of inheritance among heirs; imposition
of tasks as in government requisitions and eminent domain proceedings1; and allocation of discrete
public goods (siting problem of discrete public facilities)2. Without loss of generality, we focus on the
case of allocating tasks which agents are collectively responsible to perform, as in eminent domain or
NIMBY problem. Monetary transfers facilitate the fair distribution of total cost.
The argument on property rights over external world and self can be traced back to the "equality
of what" (Sen, 1980) debate in political philosophy. On the one end of the debate, there is the justice
theory of welfare-egalitarianism (all agents should experience the same outcome/welfare). This theory
supports public ownership of the self arguing that preferences, skills etc. are in￿ uenced by external
factors outside agents￿control such as social conditioning or biological determination (Cohen, 1989;
1Government requisition is government￿ s demand to use goods and services of the civilians usually in times of national
emergency such as natural disasters and wars. Eminent domain is government￿ s right to seize private property, without
the owner￿ s consent, for public use such as to build a road or a public utility. In both cases, owners are legally guaranteed
to receive just monetary compensation.
2All agents have equal rights or responsibilities over the public goods, but only those hosting localities experience the
bene￿ts or costs. Taxes and subsidies can help to distribute the bene￿ts or costs. Examples are locating state capitals,
parks, international airports, or public bads such as noxious facilities, waste-disposal centers, etc. (not-in-my-backyard,
NIMBY, problem).
2Roemer, 1998). Thus, no agent should be punished or rewarded for her "self" (e.g., her preference)
and welfare di⁄erentials that arise from private ownership of the self are not justi￿ed.
On the other end of the debate lie the two well-known theories of justice: equality of resources
(Dworkin, 2000) and equality of opportunities (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1989; Roemer, 1998; and Kolm,
1996). We can relate these theories to public ownership of external world and private ownership of
self as follows: suppose that the natural implication of a collectively owned external world is to grant
people equal rights and responsibilities over it. Hence, either the external world resources should be
equally distributed (equality of resources) or people should be given equal opportunities to access them
(equality of opportunities). The welfare each person enjoys from her equal share depends on her own
preferences and private ownership of self is also respected. Thus, if we formulate axioms that re￿ ect
equality of resources and equality of opportunities, these axioms would also re￿ ect in our model, the
public ownership of external world and private ownership of self. Fleurbaey (2008) brie￿ y mentions
two candidates: no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. Next, we elaborate and substantiate on this
point.
The welfare di⁄erences among agents would be solely due to the di⁄erences in their preferences, if
every agent were assigned the same bundle of discrete goods and money. This equal-resource allocation
would ensure that each agent has an equal share of the external world resources while each agent bears
the consequences of her own preferences (self/cost of performing tasks). However, in our model, the
discrete resources are heterogenous. Thus, an allocation composed of identical bundles may not exist.
The alternative is to choose a feasible allocation which is Pareto-indi⁄erent to a hypothetical reference
allocation composed of identical bundles. Egalitarian-equivalence requires only such allocations be
chosen.
Alternatively, one may argue that collective ownership of external world means granting agents
equal access to it. To implement this idea in our model, pick an allocation and imagine an ￿opportunity
set￿consisting of all the bundles comprising this allocation. Let each agent choose her most preferred
bundle from this common set. An allocation is envy-free, if each agent chooses the bundle that is
intended for her in the allocation. Since each agent faces the same set of bundles to choose from,
they have equality of opportunity over the collectively owned resources. The welfare of an agent only
depends on her choice, that is she is held responsible for her own preference and private ownership of
the self is respected.
To sum up, if agents have equal rights or responsibilities over the allocated resources (public
ownership of the external world) but are held responsible for their own preferences (private ownership
of the self), then two natural axioms that re￿ ect these rights are egalitarian-equivalence and no-envy.
These axioms re￿ ect two theories of distributive justice, respectively: equality of resources and equality
of opportunities. Note that, separately, neither egalitarian-equivalence nor no-envy imply equality of
welfares.3 However, our Theorem 1 shows that, when there are at least three agents and costs over
tasks are subadditive4, then under e¢ cient assignment of objects and strategy-proofness, egalitarian-
equivalence and no-envy is equivalent to welfare-egalitarianism. That is, under Theorem 1￿ s conditions,
resource and opportunity egalitarianism together imply welfare-egalitarianism.5 Our result is carried
over to economies with two agents (Theorem 2), if, in Theorem 1, we additionally impose population
monotonicity which also re￿ ects the public ownership of the external world: when a factor in external
world changes (population change), welfare of all agents are a⁄ected in the same direction.
3Also, it is easy to design examples to show that without imposing e¢ ciency of assignments and strategy-proofness,
the joint implication of no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence is not welfare-egalitarianism.
4Valuations over discrete goods are superadditive.
5Roemer (1986) also obtains the equivalence between resource-egalitarianism and welfare-egalitarianism in a di⁄erent
model. However, in Roemer￿ s analysis, the approach is di⁄erent and equivalence result is obtained by treating internal
traits of agents as part of the resources to equalize. In this paper, we obtain the equivalence by arguing that no-envy
and egalitarian-equivalence re￿ ect opportunity and resource egalitarianism, respectively; and characterizing mechanisms
that satisfy those two axioms.
3In Section 2, we present the model and de￿ne the mechanisms. In Section 3, we present our
characterizations and discuss the budget properties. Section 4 presents concluding remarks. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
A ￿nite set of indivisible tasks is to be allocated among a ￿nite set of agents by a center. All tasks
must be allocated. An agent can be assigned either no task, a single task, or more than one task.
Each task is assigned to only one agent. Let A be the ￿nite set of tasks, with jAj ￿ 1; and ￿;￿ be
typical elements of A:
There is an in￿nite set of ￿potential￿agents indexed by the positive natural numbers N ￿ f1;2;:::g.
In any given problem, only a ￿nite number of them are present. Let N be the set of subsets of potential
agents with at least two agents. Let n ￿ 2 and N with jNj = n be a typical element of N. The number
of agents may be smaller than, equal to, or greater than the number of tasks.
Let 2A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent i has a cost function ci : 2A ! R+ with ci(;) = 0.6
We refer to such a cost function as unrestricted. Let Cun be the set of all such functions. Our results
can be easily adapted to a setting in which for each A 2 2A with A 6= ;, ci(A) > 0:
If for each A 2 (2An;), ci(A) =
P
￿2A
ci(f￿g), then ci is additive. If for each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A with
A \ A0 = ;, ci(A [ A0) ￿ ci(A) + ci(A0), then ci is subadditive, and if for each fA;A0g ￿ 2A with
A \ A0 = ;, ci(A [ A0) ￿ ci(A) + ci(A0), then ci is superadditive. Let Cad;Csub; and Csup be the classes
of additive, subadditive, and superadditive cost functions, respectively. Let C be a generic element of
fCun;Cad;Csub;Csupg and CN be the n￿fold Cartesian product of C:
For each N 2 N, a cost pro￿le for N is a list c ￿ (c1;:::;cn): Let
S
N2N
CN be the domain of cost
pro￿les where for each i 2 N; ci 2 C.
A cost pro￿le de￿nes an economy. Let c;c0;b c be typical economies with associated agent sets
N;N0; b N: For each N 2 N and each i 2 N; let c￿i be the cost pro￿le of the agents in Nnfig: For
each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N and each c 2 CN; let cN0 be the restriction of c to N0 :
cN0 ￿ (ci)i2N0:
There is a perfectly divisible good we call ￿money￿ . Let ti denote agent i0s consumption of the
good. We call ti agent i0s transfer: if ti > 0; it is a transfer from the center to i; if ti < 0; jtij is a
transfer from i to the center.
The center assigns the tasks and determines each agent￿ s transfer. Agent i￿ s utility when she is
assigned the set of tasks Ai 2 2A (note that Ai may be empty) and consumes ti 2 R is
u(Ai;ti;ci) = ￿ci(Ai) + ti:
An assignment for N is a list (Ai)i2N such that
S
i2N
Ai = A and for each pair fi;jg ￿ N; Ai\Aj = ;.
For each N 2 N; let A(N) be the set of all possible assignments for N:
A transfer pro￿le for N is a list (ti)i2N 2 RN. An allocation for N is a list (Ai;ti)i2N where
(Ai)i2N is an assignment and (ti)i2N is a transfer pro￿le for N:
A mechanism is a function ’ ￿ (A;t) de￿ned over the union
S
N2N
CN that associates with each
economy an allocation: for each N 2 N; each c 2 CN; and each i 2 N, ’i(c) ￿ (Ai(c);ti(c)) 2 2A ￿R:
6As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
4For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; let W(c) be the minimal total cost among all possible assignments










Since there is no restriction on the size of individual or total transfer (restrictions on the size
of total transfer are discussed in the next section), every allocation is Pareto-dominated by another
allocation with higher transfers. On the other hand, since utilities are quasi-linear, given a cost pro￿le
c; an allocation that minimizes the total cost is Pareto-e¢ cient for c among all allocations with the
same, or smaller, total transfer. Our ￿rst axiom requires mechanisms to choose only such allocations.




Since costs are private information, an assignment-e¢ cient mechanism assigns the tasks so that
the actual total cost is minimal only if agents report their true costs. Similarly, truthful revelation of
costs is essential in order to determine fair allocations. Then, a desirable property for a mechanism is
that no agent should ever bene￿t by misrepresenting her costs (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
Strategy-Proofness: For each N 2 N, each i 2 N, each c 2 CN; and each c0
i 2 C, u(’i(c);ci) ￿
u(’i(c0
i;c￿i);ci):
Next, we introduce the mechanisms that are our main interest. The Egalitarian mechanisms
choose, for each economy, an e¢ cient assignment of the tasks. We work with single-valued mechanisms
and assume that each Egalitarian mechanism is associated with a tie-breaking rule ￿ that determines
which of the e¢ cient assignments (if there are more than one) is chosen. Let T be the set of all
possible tie-breaking rules.
Let ￿ : N ! R be an arbitrary function that associates each population with a real number and ￿
be the set of all such functions.
The Egalitarian mechanism associated with ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 T ; E￿;￿:
Let E￿;￿ ￿ (A￿;t￿;￿) be such that for each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; (A￿
i (c))i2N is an e¢ cient-
assignment for c and for each i 2 N;
t
￿;￿





The transfers of an Egalitarian mechanism have a simple structure: each agent pays the sum
of the costs incurred by the other agents at the e¢ cient assignment chosen by the mechanism and
receives a sum of money ￿(N) 2 R that only depends on the population, and not on the cost pro￿le
in the economy. That is, in all economies with the same agent set N, the amount that agents receive
is ￿(N) 2 R:Di⁄erent choices for ￿ correspond to di⁄erent selections from the class of Egalitarian
mechanisms:
Let E￿ ￿ fE￿;￿j ￿ 2 T g: Note that for each ￿ 2 ￿; the mechanisms in E￿ are Pareto-indi⁄erent.
That is, the particular tie-breaking rule used is irrelevant in the determination of the utilities. Let
E ￿ fE￿j ￿ 2 ￿g be the class of the Egalitarian mechanisms. The mechanisms in this class equalize
welfare of all agents:
Welfare-Egalitarianism: For each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN, u(’i(c);ci) =
u(’j(c);cj):




if and only if it belongs to E.
53 The Results
If agents have equal rights over the resources (equal responsibilities over the tasks), fairness may require
assigning each agent the same bundle. However, such an allocation composed of identical bundles is
not always feasible due to the heterogeneity of tasks. Still, we can ￿nd a feasible allocation that is
Pareto-indi⁄erent to an identical-bundle allocation. Egalitarian-equivalence requires that only those
allocations such that each agent is indi⁄erent between her assigned bundle and a common reference
bundle (consisting of a reference set of tasks and a reference transfer) should be chosen.
Egalitarian-Equivalence: For each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; there are a reference set of tasks
(which may be empty) R(c) 2 2A and a reference transfer r(c) 2 R such that for each i 2 N;
u(’i(c);ci) = u((R(c);r(c));ci):
Another central fairness notion is no-envy , which requires that each agent should ￿nd her bundle
at least as desirable as any other agent￿ s bundle. Hence, given the opportunity of choosing among all
the bundles compromising an allocation, an agent should choose her assigned bundle.
No-Envy: For each N 2 N; each pair fi;jg ￿ N; and each c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);ci):
When costs are subadditive or additive, not only the Egalitarian mechanisms, but also the following
mechanisms satisfy these two axioms.
The Extended-egalitarian mechanism associated with ￿ 2 ￿ and ￿ 2 T ; b E￿;￿:
Let b E￿;￿ ￿ (A￿;b t ￿;￿) be such that for each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; (A￿
i (c))i2N is an e¢ cient-
assignment for c; and for each N 2 N and each i 2 N;
if jNj > 2;
b t
￿;￿
i (c) = t
￿;￿
i (c) for each c 2 CN;
if jNj = 2;
either (i) b t
￿;￿
i (c) = t
￿;￿
i (c) for each c 2 CN;
or (ii) b t
￿;￿
i (c) = cj(A) ￿ cj(A￿
j(c)) + ￿(N); where j 2 Nnfig; for each c 2 CN:
That is, when there are more than two agents, the transfers of b E￿;￿ are same as the transfers of
an Egalitarian mechanism E￿;￿. However, when there are only two agents, then the mechanism has
two options for transfers, option (i) or (ii). For some populations, the transfers can be chosen equal
to the transfers of E￿;￿ (option (i)); and for other populations, the transfers can be chosen to be as
in (ii).7 Note that for a given two-agent population N; for all economies c that pertain to population
N, the mechanism should stick to one type of transfer: either (i) or (ii). That is, for a given N 2 N
with jNj = 2; either (i) applies for each c 2 CN or, (ii) applies for each c 2 CN:
Let b E ￿ f b E￿;￿j ￿ 2 ￿;￿ 2 T g be the class of such mechanisms. Note that E ￿ b E:
Now, we present our ￿rst characterization.
Theorem 1. On the subadditive domain, an assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism is
egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free if and only if it belongs to b E:
7Note that when there are only two agents, the transfers speci￿ed by b E
￿;￿ in option (ii) di⁄er from the transfers of a
Pivotal (Vickrey) mechanism by the amount ￿(N).
6Next, we present a solidarity axiom that re￿ ects public ownership of an external world factor that
is relevant in our model, namely population. Suppose new agents join some initial population. The
cost of an e¢ cient assignment in the larger population is at most as large as the one in the smaller
population. Hence, a population increase is good news for the society. Since none of the agents
in the initial population is responsible for the population increase (a change in the publicly owned
external world), all of them should be at least as well o⁄ in the larger population as in the smaller one
(Thomson, 1983).
Population Monotonicity: For each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0, and each
c 2 CN,
u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’i(cN0 );ci):
In Lemma 3 in the Appendix, we characterize the mechanisms that are assignment-e¢ cient,
strategy-proof, and population monotonic.
Our next Theorem states that under assignment e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness, on the subad-
ditive domain, egalitarian-equivalence, no-envy, and population monotonicity together imply welfare-
egalitarianism in economies with any number of agents. That is, if we add population monotonicity
in Theorem 1, then class (b EnE) is ruled out completely and we are left with a subclass of E:
Theorem 2. On the subadditive domain, an assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism is
egalitarian-equivalent, envy-free, and population monotonic if and only if it is an egalitarian mecha-
nism in E￿ where ￿ : N ! R is such that for each pair fN0;Ng ￿ N with N0 ￿ N;
￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0): (1)
In our model, external world is comprised of joint resources and population. Due to the quasilin-
earity of preferences, private ownership of self requires bearing the e⁄ects of one￿ s own cost function.
One can also interpret cost function of an agent as an indicator of her skill: the lower the costs a
person generates to perform tasks, the more skilled she is in performing those tasks. A more skilled
agent would enjoy a higher welfare from the same bundle than a less skilled agent.
Each of the axioms used in Theorems 1 and 2 can be argued to re￿ ect the ownership rights of
public over external world and of individual over her self. Arguments for egalitarian-equivalence,
no-envy, and population monotonicity are already presented in the Introduction. Strategy-proofness
re￿ ects the fact that preferences are in the domain of private ownership of the self; hence, even in
cases where the center knows the preferences, it should treat them as privately held information.8
Assignment-e¢ ciency may also be related to the joint ownership of external world resources: each
agent should have the same right to propose a new allocation of the discrete resources as long as the
proposal doesn￿ t harm anyone else and total transfer does not increase.
The characterizations in Theorems 1 and 2 indicate that, on the subadditive domain, a mechanism
respecting the aforementioned ownership rights should actually equalize welfares and ignore the private
ownership of the self. Without population monotonicity, this result is valid only for economies with
more than two agents.
The obvious limitation of the results is that they only hold when the costs are additive or sub-
additive, or when there is a single object to assign (e.g., to choose the locality to host a single
waste-disposal facility in a NIMBY problem). The mechanisms in b E are egalitarian-equivalent on
every domain. However, by PÆpai (2003), on the unrestricted domain, no assignment-e¢ cient and
strategy-proof mechanism is envy-free. Characterizing assignment-e¢ cient, strategy-proof, and envy-
free mechanisms on the superadditive domain is an open question. Characterizations on this domain
are both technically and notationally complex; most of the related papers in the literature restrict
their results to the additive domain, single-object, or homogenous objects case.
8See also footnote 2 in Moulin and Roemer (1989).
7The class E we characterized here is a sub-class of the well-known class of Groves mechanisms
(Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; and Groves, 1973) due to Lemma 1 and the following result (the proof
of Lemma 2 follows from Holmstr￿m (1979) since for each N 2 N, CN is convex):
Lemma 2. A mechanism is assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof on
S
N2N
CN if and only if it is a
Groves mechanism.
It is well known that no assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof (i.e., Groves mechanism) balances
the budget. That is, total transfer does not add up to a required ￿xed amount in all economies. Hence,
if we require truthful revelation of the cost functions, we need to pay the price of budget imbalances.
Fortunately, we can select members of class E that generate de￿cits bounded above (surpluses bounded
below):
Let T : N ! R: Suppose we require that the de￿cit in any economy with population N, no matter
what the costs of the agents are; should never exceed an amount T(N) 2 R (T￿bounded-de￿cit): for
each N 2 N and each c 2 CN,
P
i2N
ti(c) ￿ T(N): If this condition is satis￿ed, then the center is also
guaranteed to generate a budget surplus at least as much as ￿T(N). Also, note that a mechanism
generates no-de￿cit if it satis￿es T￿bounded-de￿cit where for each N 2 N; T(N) = 0:
By Proposition 2 in Yengin (2010), an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism satis￿es
T￿bounded-de￿cit if and only if it is an Egalitarian mechanism E￿;￿ such that for each N 2 N;
￿(N) ￿
T(N)
jNj :9 Hence, assuming that egalitarian-equivalence re￿ ects resource-egalitarianism, for
Groves mechanisms with bounded de￿cits, resource egalitarianism implies welfare-egalitarianism.
If tasks are imposed on agents as in government requisitions and eminent domain, then agents do
not have the option of refusing their task assignments, even if they may experience a negative utility.
Also, if agents are collectively responsible for the completion of tasks (as in NIMBY problems), then
they are responsible for bearing the costs of the tasks and it may be natural that they should end up
with negative utilities. But if one insists on that no agent should experience a negative utility level
(individual rationality), the Egalitarian mechanisms do not satisfy this property. However, if there is
an upper bound on the cost that any agent may incur, then there are individually rational Egalitarian
mechanisms:
Suppose there exists K 2 R+ such that for each i 2 N and each A 2 2A, ci(A) ￿ K: Then, on
the domain of cost pro￿les comprised of such cost functions; an Egalitarian mechanism is individually
rational if and only if it belongs to E￿ where ￿ : N ! R is such that for each N 2 N; ￿(N) ￿ K:
To see this, by individual rationality, for each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; u(E
￿;￿
i (c);ci) ￿ 0; that is,




Most characterizations of welfare-egalitarian solutions in the literature rely on solidarity axioms (see,
for references, GinØs and Marhuenda, 2000). Here, we presented an alternative foundation for welfare-
egalitarianism mainly based on no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence. Although, these axioms are the
two most essential notions of justice in fair division problems, their compatibility is not guaranteed
in several models: In time division problems (division of a one-dimensional, non-homogeneous, and
atomless continuum, when each agent is to receive an interval), no egalitarian-equivalent mechanism
9 Among all egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanisms that satisfy T￿bounded-de￿cit, the ones for which this in-
equality holds as an equality Pareto-dominate the others. Also, note that an Egalitarian mechanism E
￿;￿ generates
no-de￿cit when for each N 2 N; ￿(N) ￿ 0:
8is envy-free (Thomson, 1996). As showed by Postlewaite (quoted by Daniel, 1978), there are well-
behaved exchange economies where all egalitarian-equivalent and Pareto-e¢ cient allocations violate
no-envy. Under budget balance, no-envy is incompatible with egalitarian-equivalence in queueing
problems (Chun, 2006); and in a more general model of allocating indivisible goods and money where
each agent can be assigned at most one object (Thomson, 1990).
Theorem 2 also brings good news in showing the compatibility of population monotonicity and
no-envy, which doesn￿ t exist in most other models, for instance, in the problem of allocating an in￿-
nitely divisible good over which agents have single-peaked preferences (Thomson, 1995b); in exchange
economies when Pareto-e¢ ciency is required (Kim, 2004); in the problem of allocating indivisible
goods and money where each agent can be assigned at most one object and budget-balance is required
(Alkan, 1994, Tadenuma and Thomson, 1993).
To sum up, in our setting several equity axioms that are incompatible in many other models can
be satis￿ed jointly. However, the price of the compatibility is to overwrite any welfare di⁄erentials
arising from private ownership of the self. This is evidenced by Theorems 1 and 2 here, as well as
our results in our companion paper, Yengin (2011)10. In other words, for Groves mechanisms, joint
implication of most fairness axioms is welfare-egalitarianism as displayed in Table 1.11
One can design Egalitarian mechanisms that satisfy all of the axioms listed in Table 1. Hence, in
our model , the Egalitarian mechanisms appear to be the best candidates to satisfy several di⁄erent
equity and solidarity requirements as well as generating bounded de￿cits. These results reinforce the
importance of the class E in the economic setting we study. Note that the Pivotal/Vickrey mechanisms,
which have been the focus of most of the literature on the Groves mechanisms, violate egalitarian-
equivalence, population monotonicity, solidarity, T￿bounded-de￿cit, and no-de￿cit.
On the subadditive domain:
1: If jNj ￿ 3, EE and NE , E (Theorem 1).
2: EE and NE and PM ) E (Theorem 2).
3: NE and S , E (Yengin, 2011):
On any domain:
4: OP and S , E (Yengin, 2011):
5: EE and S , E (Yengin, 2011):
6: EE and T ￿ BD ) E (Yengin, 2010).
7: EE and ND ) E (Yengin, 2010).
8: SALB and ND ) E (Yengin, 2010).
Table 1: Results under assignment-e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness.
5 Appendix
For each i 2 N; let hi be a real-valued function de￿ned over the union
S
N2N
CN such that for each
N 2 N with i 2 N and each c 2 CN; hi depends only on c￿i: Let h = (hi)i2N and H be the set of all
such h:
Let Gh;￿ ￿ (A￿;th;￿) be a mechanism such that for each N 2 N and each c 2 CN; (A￿
i (c))i2N is an
10In Yengin (2011), we characterize the Egalitarian mechanisms by solidarity (when costs of some agents increase,
then no one is better o⁄) and one of the following: order preservation (agents with lower costs are weakly better o⁄),
egalitarian-equivalence, or on the subadditive domain, no-envy.
11EE: egalitarian-equivalence, NE: no-envy, S: solidarity (Yengin, 2011), PM: population monotonicity, OP: order
preservation (Yengin, 2011), T-BD: T-bounded de￿cit, ND: no-de￿cit, SALB: stand-alone lower bound (welfare of no
agent is below the level she would have if she performed all tasks and received no money; Yengin, 2010).
9e¢ cient-assignment for c and for each i 2 N;
t
h;￿




j(c)) + hi(c￿i) = ￿W(c) + ci(A￿
i (c)) + hi(c￿i): (2)
The mechanism Gh;￿ is called a Groves mechanism. The transfer of each agent determined by a
Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each agent pays the total cost incurred by all other agents at
the assignment chosen by the mechanism. Second, each agent i receives a sum of money hi(c￿i) 2 R
that does not depend on her own cost ci.
We have the following equation which will be of much use.12 For each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and
each c 2 CN;
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c) + hi(c￿i): (3)
Note that E￿;￿ = Gh;￿; where for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) = ￿(N):
Similarly, b E￿;￿ = Gh;￿ such that for each N 2 N and each i 2 N;
if jNj > 2; then hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) for each c 2 CN; (4)
if jNj = 2; then
(i) either hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) for each c 2 CN; (5)
(ii) or hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) + cj(A); where j 2 Nnfig; for each c 2 CN: (6)
Proof of Theorem 1:
If Part: Pick an assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism. By Lemma 2, it is a Groves
mechanism Gh;￿ for some h 2 H and ￿ 2 T : Let Gh;￿ 2 b E. Then, there is ￿ : N!R such that
Gh;￿ = b E￿;￿ as described above.
We will show that Gh;￿ is (a) envy-free on the subadditive domain, and (b) egalitarian-equivalent on
every domain.
(a) Assume, by contradiction, that Gh;￿ is not envy-free on the subadditive domain. Then, there are
N 2 N; c 2 CN
sub; and fi;jg ￿ N such that u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) < u(G
h;￿
j (c);ci): This inequality, (2), and (3)
together imply





j(c)) ￿ W(c) + cj(A￿
j(c)) + hj(c￿j): (7)
First, consider cases (4) and (5). By (7), ci(A￿
j(c)) < cj(A￿
j(c)): This inequality implies that A￿
j(c) 6= ;
and since c is subadditive, we have
ci(A￿
i (c) [ A￿
j(c)) ￿ ci(A￿
i (c)) + ci(A￿
j(c)) < ci(A￿
i (c)) + cj(A￿
j(c)):
Then; it would be less costly than W(c); if i was assigned (A￿
i (c)[A￿
j(c)) and j was assigned no task;
which contradicts that A￿(c) is an e¢ cient assignment.
Now, consider case (6). By (7),
cj(A) < ￿ci(A￿
j(c)) + cj(A￿
j(c)) + ci(A): (8)
By (8), A￿
j(c) 6= A: Since c is subadditive and A = A￿
i (c) [ A￿
j(c); then ci(A) ￿ ci(A￿
i (c)) + ci(A￿
j(c)):
This inequality and (8) together imply cj(A) < ci(A￿
i (c)) + cj(A￿
j(c)): Then, it would be less costly
than W(c); if j was assigned all the tasks; which contradicts that A￿(c) is an e¢ cient assignment.
12By (3), for each h 2 H; the mechanisms in fG
h;￿g￿2T are Pareto-indi⁄erent.
10(b) Now, we show that Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent. Let N 2 N and c 2 CN:
First, consider cases (4) and (5). By (3), for each i 2 N; u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c)+￿(N): Let R(c) = ;
and r(c) = ￿W(c) + ￿(N): Then, for each i 2 N; u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿ci(R(c)) + r(c): Hence, Gh;￿ is
egalitarian-equivalent.
Next, consider case (6). By (3), for each i 2 N; u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c) + ￿(N) + cj(A) for
j 2 Nnfig: Let R(c) = A and r(c) = ￿W(c) +
P
i2N
ci(A) + ￿(N): Then, for each i 2 N;
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿ci(R(c)) + r(c): Hence, Gh;￿ is egalitarian-equivalent. ￿
Only-if Part: Pick an assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism. By Lemma 2, it is a
Groves mechanism Gh;￿ for some h 2 H and ￿ 2 T : Let Gh;￿ be egalitarian-equivalent and envy-free
on the subadditive domain.
By Theorem 1 in Yengin (2010) (adapted to our variable population setting), if a Groves mechanism
is egalitarian-equivalent, then for economies with di⁄erent populations, di⁄erent reference set of tasks
can be chosen; but for economies with the same population N; the same reference set of tasks R(N)
must work. Moreover, by Yengin (2010), a Groves mechanism is egalitarian-equivalent if and only if
for each N 2 N; there are a real number ￿(N) 2 R and a reference set R(N) 2 2A such that for each
i 2 N;
hi(c￿i) = ￿(N) +
X
j2Nnfig
cj(R(N)) for each c 2 CN: (9)
By Theorem 1 in PÆpai (2003) (adapted to our variable-population and undesirable-objects setting), if
Gh;￿ is envy-free on the subadditive domain, then there is a list of functions indexed by populations,
f￿NgN2N with ￿N : R+ ! R such that for each N 2 N; each i 2 N; and each c 2 CN
sub;
hi(c￿i) = ￿N(W(c￿i)); (10)
By (9) and (10), for each N 2 N and each pair fi;jg ￿ N;
￿N(W(c￿i)) ￿ ￿N(W(c￿j)) = cj(R(N)) ￿ ci(R(N)) for each c 2 CN
sub: (11)
We will prove that Gh;￿ = b E￿;￿ by showing, on the subadditive domain, the equivalence of equation
(9) to (4), (5), and (6). To achieve this, we need to consider the following two cases:
Case 1: For each N 2 N with jNj > 2; there is ￿(N) 2 R such that (9) holds for R(N) = ; for
each c 2 CN
sub: That is, equality (9) is equivalent to (4).
Proof of Case 1:
Let N 2 N with jNj > 2: By egalitarian-equivalence, there are ￿(N) 2 R and R(N) 2 2A such that
(9) holds for each c 2 CN
sub.
Claim: For each c 2 CN
sub and each pair fi;jg ￿ N, ci(R(N)) = cj(R(N)):
Note that the Claim holds for each c 2 CN
sub; and by (9), R(N) is same for each c 2 CN
sub: This is
possible if and only if R(N) = ;: This would prove that Case 1 holds.
Now, we will show that the Claim is true:
Assume, by contradiction to the claim, that there is c 2 CN
sub such that for some pair fi;jg ￿ N,
ci(R(N)) 6= cj(R(N)): (12)
Without loss of generality, let W(c￿j) ￿ W(c￿i): Let ￿ ￿ cj(R(N)) ￿ ci(R(N)): Let b c 2 CN
ad be as
follows:
11(i) for each A 2 2A; b ci(A) =
jAj W(c￿j)
jAj ;
(ii) there is " > maxf￿￿;0g such that for each A 2 2A; b cj(A) = jAj
￿
W(c￿i)
jAj + ￿ + "
￿
;
(iii) for each k 2 Nnfi;jg and each A 2 2A; b ck(A) =
jAj W(c￿i)
jAj :
Note that ￿ + " > maxf￿;0g: Hence, for each A 2 (2An;); b cj(A) > b ck(A):
By (i) and (ii), for each A 2 (2An;);








By (ii) and (iii), (I) W(b c￿i) = b ck(A) = W(c￿i) for some k 2 Nnfi;jg:
Since W(c￿j) ￿ W(c￿i); by (i) and (iii), (II) W(b c￿j) = b ci(A) = W(c￿j).
By (I), (II), and (11), cj(R(N)) ￿ ci(R(N)) = ￿ = b cj(R(N)) ￿ b ci(R(N)): This equality and (13)
together imply R(N) = ;: This implies cj(R(N)) = ci(R(N)); which contradicts (12). Hence, Claim
must be true.
Case 2: For each N 2 N with jNj = 2; there is ￿(N) 2 R such that (9) holds either for R(N) = ;
for each c 2 CN
sub; or for R(N) = A for each c 2 CN
sub: That is, equality (9) is equivalent to (5) or (6).
Proof of Case 2:
Let N 2 N with jNj = 2: Without loss of generality, let N = fi;jg: By egalitarian-equivalence, there
are ￿(N) 2 R and R(N) 2 2A such that (9) holds for each c 2 CN
sub: We will show that R(N) 2 f;;Ag:
Let c 2 CN
sub and b c = (ci;b cj) 2 CN
sub be such that (I) b cj(A) = cj(A) and (II) for each A 2 (2Anf;;Ag);
b cj(A) 6= cj(A). By (I), W(b c￿i) = cj(A) = W(c￿i): This equality and (10) together imply
hi(b c￿i) = hi(c￿i): This equality and (9) together imply b cj(R(N)) = cj(R(N)): This equality and (II)
together imply that R(N) 2 f;;Ag: This proves Case 2. ￿
Lemma 3. A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ is population monotonic if and only if for each pair
fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0, and each c 2 CN,
hi(c￿i) ￿ hi(cN0 nfig): (14)
Proof of Lemma 3: Let h 2 H be as in (14). Let fN;N0g ￿ N be such that N0 ￿ N; i 2 N0,
and c 2 CN: Since W(cN0) ￿ W(c); by (3) and (14), u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) ￿ u(G
h;￿
i (cN0);ci): Hence, Gh;￿ is
population monotonic.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a population monotonic Groves mechanism. Assume, by contradiction, that
there are fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N, i 2 N0; and c 2 CN for which
hi(c￿i) < hi(cN0 nfig): (15)
For each A 2 (2An;); let P(A) = fA1;A2;:::;Akg be a partition of A into k ￿ jAj non-empty subsets.
That is, for each pair fA0;A00g ￿ P(A); A0 \ A00 = ; and [
A02P(A)
A0 = A.
Let P(A) ￿ fP(A) : P(A) 6= fAgg be the set of all partitions of A except for the partition fAg:
Let b ci be such that for each ￿ 2 A; b ci(f￿g) = min
j2Nnfig
fcj(f￿g)g; and each A 2 2A;








12As an illustration of calculation of (16), suppose A = f￿;￿;￿g, N = fi;k;lg; and c 2 CN: The following
table presents c￿i and the corresponding b ci:
f￿g f￿g f￿g f￿;￿g f￿;￿g f￿;￿g A
ck 12 5 8 13 19 10 5
cl 10 16 12 20 20 22 4
b ci 10 5 8 13 18 10 4
To see how b ci is calculated, consider A = fa;￿g: There are two ways to partition A : P(A) =
ffag;f￿gg and P0(A) = fAg: Here, P(A) = fP(A)g and
P
A02P(A)
b ci(A0) = b ci(fag) +b ci(f￿g) = 15: Since
min
j2Nnfig
fcj(A)g = 13 < 15; by (16); b ci(A) = 13: ￿
Let b c = (b ci;c￿i) 2 CN: Since b c￿i = c￿i and b cN0 nfig = cN0 nfig; by (15)
hi(b c￿i) < hi(b cN0 nfig): (17)
By (16), for each A 2 2A; b ci(A) ￿ min
j2Nnfig
fcj(A)g: This inequality and the fact that b ci is additive or
subadditive together imply W(b c) = W(b cN0) = b ci(A): These equalities, population monotonicity, and
(3) together imply hi(b c￿i) ￿ hi(b cN0 nfig); which contradicts (17): ￿
Proof of Theorem 2: Let E￿;￿ be an Egalitarian mechanism such that ￿ is as in (1). By Lemmas
1 and 2, and Theorem 1, E￿;￿ is an egalitarian-equivalent Groves mechanism that is envy-free on the
subadditive domain. By Lemma 3, E￿;￿ is population monotonic.
Conversely, let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that is egalitarian-equivalent, population monotonic, and
envy-free on the subadditive domain. By Lemma 3, h 2 H is as in (14). By Theorem 1, Gh;￿ belongs
to b E.
Assume that Gh;￿ 2 (b EnE): Then, by (6), there is N0 = fi;jg 2 N such that hi(cj) = cj(A) + ￿(N0)
for each (ci;cj) 2 CN0
sub:
Let N = fi;j;kg 2 N: Then, by (4), hi(cj;ck) = ￿(N) for each c = (ci;cj;ck) 2 CN
sub.





￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0) + "
￿
: (18)
Since (ci;b cj) 2 CN0
sub; by (6), (I) hi(b cj) = b cj(A)+￿(N0): Since (ci;b cj;ck) 2 CN
sub; by (4), (II) hi(b cj;ck) =
￿(N).
By (18), b cj(A) = ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0) + ": This equality, (I), and (II) together imply hi(b cj) = ￿(N) + " >
hi(b cj;ck): This inequality contradicts (14). Hence, Gh;￿ = 2 (b EnE):
Let Gh;￿ 2 E. Then, there is ￿ : N!R such that Gh;￿ = E￿;￿:
Note that for each pair fN;N0g ￿ N such that N0 ￿ N; each i 2 N0, and each c 2 CN, hi(c￿i) = ￿(N)
and hi(cN0nfig) = ￿(N0): By (14), ￿(N) ￿ ￿(N0): Hence, E￿;￿ 2 E￿ where ￿ : N ! R is as in (1). ￿
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